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On January 15, 1966, when reaction to a strike by public employees of
the New York City transit system had ascended to apoplectic pitch,
the Scripps Howard newspapers in tight-lipped acerbity scratched out an
editorial plea: "Close the gap. The strike reveals a broad gap in present
labor law which permits the public to be savagely victimized by ruthless
labor barons .... The primary fault is that the Taft-Hartley Act specifi-
cally states that none of its provisions apply to public employees."
The plea and the remedy might well have been stuffed into a bottle
and tossed into the Atlantic for all the ripples they caused in our own
country. Had the message reached almost any portion of the shoreline
of Western Europe, it would have been accorded a far warmer reception
than it received here. No reactions at all disturbed the domestic seismo-
graphs; and the strike--and tempers-eventually sputtered to an incon-
clusive halt. Four years, and many such strikes later, find us still the
pained victims of the dread disease--"gaposis" of the labor law.
Axiomatic appears to be the proposition that twelve million public
workers in the United States shall not enjoy, indulge or otherwise uti-
lize the economic rights of private workers, particularly the right to
strike against their government employers. Rivalling in intensity this
carefully preserved pre-conception is the conviction that employees of our
federal, state and local. governments must not be required to join or pay
dues to a labor organization as a condition of continued employment.
Less obsessive in a gradually relaxing scale, but at one time equally ta-
booed with the above, are current attitudes toward the delegation by
government of authority to a neutral third party to render binding deci-
sions regarding employee grievances, the right of government to enter
into a legally enforceable contract with a labor union, the right to bilat-
erally sign labor agreements, the right to grant recognition to one labor
organization as the sole and exclusive agent for all employees in a pre-
scribed unit-thus denying equal application of the laws to other organi-
zations, the right to deny managerial employees the union privileges ac-
corded others, the right of public employers to recognize the majority
will of their employees through the secret ballot or other acceptable
means, indeed the right to recognize the right of public workers to join
bona fide labor organizations of their own choosing.
"Of their own choosing." For millions of Americans employed, if
they were fortunate enough, in the mines, the mills, the factories and
construction in the mid-'30s, this phrase became the battle cry of eco-
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nomic freedom. The National Industrial Recovery Act, and in 1935 the
National Labor Relations Act, proclaimed the right of American workers
to join unions of their own choosing. Employers were required under
penalty of the National Labor Relations Act to respect that right. A Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, its members appointed for staggered terms
by the President and removable only for cause, was established as an in-
dependent regulatory agency for purposes of administering the law. In-
dependent of the Chief Executive and the Congress, at least in its routine
administrative chores, the National Labor Relations Board would seek to
bring peace with justice to the turbulent labor scene generally, but not
however to "make the whole scene." For, only those employed by enter-
prise substantially involved in interstate commerce were protected by the
law. Specifically excluded were employees of the Federal government,
the states and their political subdivisions, and of private, non-profit in-
stitutions such as hospitals and colleges. Farm workers were also set
aside, as were those employed in intrastate commerce. Although coverage
under the Act has since been broadened, notably in the inclusion of the
hotel industry and through a more liberal definition of interstate com-
merce, there has been no serious effort in thirty-five years to apply the
Act to public employees at any level of government.
State and local government employees were excluded in 1935 osten-
sibly because public agencies were not considered to be "enterprises"
under the meaning of the Act, nor were they construed to be factors in
"commerce." Further, Congressional regulation of state and local em-
ployees' conditions of work would have been branded an immoral and
unconstitutional invasion of state sovereignty. Other New Deal legisla-
tion of the period-Social Security, Fair Labor Standards, Unemployment
Compensation-also excluded public employees and their 'sovereign"
employers. It has since been suggested that exclusion of public workers
was motivated less by constitutional principle than by political patron-
age, that political leaders were determined to protect their prerogatives to
dole out public jobs to the faithful, collect kickbacks from them, and
generally run the plantation without interference. In any event, how-
ever mixed and impure the motivation, while unionization mushroomed
in sectors protected by the National Labor Relations Board, it lagged in
those areas of employment that remained vulnerable to employer reprisal.
The public services, particularly at the state and local levels, expanded
rapidly in numbers employed, but only negligibly in numbers unionized.
It appears that public employees, non-profit institutional employees
and agricultural workers continue to be denied coverage of the National
Labor Relations Act precisely because powerful interest groups have suc-
cessfully fought to impede legitimate unionization in these fields.
Scripps-Howard newspapers may have been right on the mark when they
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editorialized further at the time of the 1966 New York City transit strike:
"... the National Labor Relations Act specifically states none of its pro-
visions apply to public employees. This was written in because Congress
did not want unions of public employees to have the full bargaining
powers, use of National Labor Relations Board procedures, strike priv-
ileges and other rights granted ordinary unions." No mention here of
"sovereignty," "state's rights," "federalism," "constitutionality," even
"civil service." The editorial writer is not at all concerned over the de-
privation suffered by public workers. He does not issue the call for a
day of atonement for the sins of omission. On the contrary, he slices
deftly through the mythos that has for too long blurred the reality of
public employment, perceives truth pure and pulsating, and, in pursuit of
"justice" for the public, demands that public employees be compelled to
adhere to the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act! The self interest of
employers and employees gives way to the need, as understood by the
editorial writer, for imposition of the strike-deterring features of the na-
tional labor law in a dispute which is severe, but local in impact. Pure
power considerations apparently explain why public employees have un-
til now been exempt from the rights-and the responsibilities-of the
National Labor Law. Ironically, public demand to be protected from in-
creasingly powerful public employee unions may be the precipitating fac-
tor that results in coverage under the National Labor Relations Board.
In 1950 one out of ten American workers was employed by a public
agency. By 1966, the ratio was one to seven. It has been estimated that
in 1975 fully twenty per cent of the work force in the United States
will be on a public payroll. Millions more are employed by quasi-public
institutions, including hospitals and nursing homes. Many others who
work for gas, electric, communications and transit utilities may be pri-
vate employees covered by the National Labor Relations Board today, and
public employees uncovered tomorrow, or the reverse, or the double re-
verse. Despite the changing character of the work force, and the mixed
bag of relatively essential services presently dispensed by government
agencies (from police to parking lots), and by private enterprise (from
destruction to deodorants), we persist in maintaining a dual value sys-
tem which has relegated public employment as such to less than equal
status.
Inferior rights tend to produce inferior conditions. Fully established
labor organizations in the covered sector have achieved wage levels that
far surpass salaries paid for similar work in uncovered employment. Un-
skilled or skilled, jobs in protected categories bring pay rates that are con-
sistently higher. The custodial worker in an auto plant makes in excess
of $1.00 per hour more than the average custodial worker, organized
or unorganized, in public employment. The laborer employed in coy-
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ered corporate construction, union or non-union, earns far more than the
laborer in uncovered corporate agriculture.
Most public employees are denied the minimum wage and overtime
pay guarantees of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act. The law has
been mandatory since 1938 for workers in interstate commerce, and since
a 1967 amendment, is applicable to public and private employees in the
schools, universities and hospitals. But hundreds of thousands, per-
haps millions, of uncovered public workers today do not receive time and
one half pay for work performed in excess of forty hours in a week.
Often they are required to take equal compensatory time off rather than
have even the minor benefit of straight time cash pay for overtime worked.
Because FLSA did not until recently apply to any public employees, it
has been convenient for public employers, as they have done over collec-
tive bargaining, to read into the omission an implied prohibition on
their power to bargain and similarly on their authority to grant overtime
premium pay. Having successfully evaded coverage, they then use the
federal exclusion to righteously justify their subsequent refusal to assert
the "state's right" to act of its own volition. Although FLSA has from
its inception required only that work beyond forty hours in one calendar
week be compensated at no less than time and one half, covered workers
who have also had the protection of the National Labor Relations Board
tend frequently to enjoy contract clauses that provide for premium pay
for time worked beyond eight hours in any one day, or for hours worked
on Saturday or Sunday, regardless of the total number of hours worked
through the week. Double time is commonplace for Sunday work as
such. Public employees, late bloomers, are only now generally experienc-
ing the minimal standards of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The Federal foundation for a national system of unemployment com-
pensation was set in 1935. Each state, however, was left to determine
within broad limits the amount and duration of weekly benefits. Again,
although coverage is mandatory for all but the very smallest private prof-
it enterprise, public agencies, even those employing thousands of workers,
have been exempt from the compulsory features of the Federal law. Not
that the question of lay-off is academic in state and local government.
The winds of political chance and of economic adversity do from time
to time shake the branches of the civil service, dislodging public employ-
ees from supposedly secure perches. Ironically, workers in state unem-
ployment offices are likely candidates for lay-off whenever employment
rises in the private sector. Nevertheless, with the exception of but a few
states, unemployment compensation is denied public employees. The ten
states that cover public workers do so voluntarily, taking advantage of a
permissive feature presently part of the Federal Law.
Workmen's compensation for job-incurred injury or illness is con-
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trolled entirely by the states. There are no Federal guidelines. The
states have established mandatory systems of coverage which generally
provide benefit patterns that are related to those which obtain for unem-
ployment compensation. However, only half the states have bothered to
include state and local government employees under their workmen's
compensation programs.
Although state and local government employment is the fastest grow-
ing sector of the American economy, and threatens soon to entrap fully a
fifth of the work force within its less than equal enclave, only a minimal
effort has been made to apply federally guaranteed rights to all of public
employment. Public employers, because they are no different from their
counterparts in private employment, prefer it this way. Scratch any em-
ployer, private or public, and you reveal a man at once possessive of his pre-
rogatives, fearful of interference from any source-especially the Federal
Government--sensitive to criticism, and personally affronted by the unioni-
zation of "his" employees. His love of the status quo is perfectly
understandable. But, the notion that public employment by its nature is
"different" infects the thinking of all Americans, including public em-
ployees and their unions.
Academicians assume an inherent difference. The author of a schol-
arly work regarding private strikes that affect the public interest, dis-
poses of the public sector of the economy with one stale sentence: "...
strikes by government employees . . . present such unique legal and po-
litical problems that they deserve separate consideration."1  Everett M.
Kassalow, a former functionary of the AFL-CIO, in an article entitled
"Trade Unionism Goes Public" in the Winter, 1969 issue of The Public
Interest, draws upon AFL-CIO President George Meany to support his
separatist views: "Although Meany recommended a number of changes
in the workings of (Federal Executive Order 10988 covering Federal em-
ployees) he did not question the ban on strikes." Kassalow, thus forti-
fied, attacks Theodore Kheel's criticism of the New York State Taylor
Act: "In (Kheel's) refusal to make any distinction between public and
private collective bargaining, so far as the right to strike is concerned
. . . he does go too far." Where the sovereignty doctrine used to be
sufficient to delineate the public from the private sector, it is interesting
that the arguments are now joined, at least among scholars, on a more
rational level. Jack Stieber, for example, in his "Collective Bargaining
in the Public Sector," in Challenges to Collective Bargaining, edited by
Lloyd Ullman, lists a series of distinctive points based on the notions that
government service is essential service, and that the strike is an economic
weapon inappropriate in public employment. Stieber recognizes that an
1 D. E. CULLEN, NATIONAL EMERGENCY STRIKEs 8 (New York State School of Industrial
and Labor Relations, 1968).
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essential service may be public or private, and that not all public service
is essential. His argument centers, therefore, on the thesis that in pri-
vate industry employers have countervailing rights to the strike: "They
may lock out their employees, try to break the strike by operating with
other employees, suspend operations . . . ; they may even choose to go
out of business entirely . . . both parties are subject to market pres-
sures (except for certain monopoly industries e.g., telephones)." Ac-
cording to Steiber, public employers do not have access to these weapons,
and are therefore at a disadvantage when confronted with a striking un-
ion. Note the change in imagery. Government is now the underdog,
the immovable target that must have special protection from public em-
ployee unions! Defense of the "difference doctrine" is, however, not so
immutable. It takes on diverse forms as circumstances shift, but the a
priori point remains. Perhaps academicians need the uniqueness theory
in order to nourish the new study area of public labor relations, an area
that seems to become more specialized in geometric proportion to the
number of words written in support of its uniqueness.
There appears to be generally in the United States a material and psy-
chological need to harp on the uniqueness of public employment. The
American people have throughout our history tended to view govern-
ment as a detached "them" institution, an institution that has "taken"
from the people more than it has "given." From the tax collectors of
George III to the tax collectors of the modern day, government employees
have enjoyed (if they are masochists) a special status in American life.
Middle class mythology marked the public employee as "the man who
couldn't make it" in the tough competition of private enterprise. No
Alger he, the government worker! Often he has been viewed with con-
tempt as the recipient of political reward, a man of no merit or training.
His job was, in many cases still is, part of the spoils of political war.
Where the merit system has joined the spoils system (it never fully sup-
plants it), the stress is on security even at the expense of salary compar-
able with that of similar private employment, and indeed at the sacri-
fice of the fundamental right of political and economic expression. It is
understood that the public employee in the United States is politically and
economically "different."
Public employees, their unions, and the labor movement of which
they are a part recognize, and to an important extent accept, this separate
status, and react in separate, yet essentially similar ways. Top labor lead-
ers, for example, have left the impression that compulsory arbitration
may be a reasonable substitute for the strike in the public service. With
equal alacrity, they would reject out of hand, however, the suggestion
that arbitration should be compelled in any dispute involving private
employment. They hesitate as a result to advocate extension of the Na-
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tional Labor Relations Act to public employment out of fear that such
inclusion would necessarily jeopardize the rights of private workers.
Organized labor- at the local level often adopts an uncertain, ambiva-
lent stance as it confronts the anamoly of unionization of public employees.
In the good old days, before public workers claimed in earnest the right
to collective bargaining, local labor leaders were often content with "a
piece of the action" involving public employment. Certain patronage
positions were perhaps made available to leaders of labor; it might have
been understood that skilled craftsmen employed by the city or county
would be recruited by way of recommendation of the appropriate craft
union business agent; that public works contracts would go only to
union contractors; that the little favors having to do with the courts and
the police would be enjoyed. Labor organizations, seeking in recent
years to unionize rank and file public workers, naturally expected to have
the support and protection of organized labor in the community, and for
the most part, they got the help. Indeed, there are many public employee
local unions flourishing today only because they were aided by local
labor. But, the question of "protection" was a two-sided affair in many
places, and still is even where the public union is finally well established.
For the local labor leadership, "protection" involves the right of rank
and file workers to join a legitimate union on the one hand, and on the
other the retention of patronage and assorted perquisites that have come
labor's way as the result of political alliances developed over the years.
It may be considered equally imperative that in the best interests of the
general labor movement both features be zealously guarded. Unfortu-
nately, the two interests do not always coincide. What is good for the
men may not be good for the mayor, and it is on such occasions that
the life of the central labor council leader is not an easy one. He has to
choose sides, or even pose as a neutral. Oddly, leaders of the general
labor movement seem to have little difficulty adjusting to the role of
mediator in disputes between public employees and their employers.
This would be almost inconceivable if the antagonists were in the pri-
vate sector. Similarly, in the matter of jurisdiction among several unions
that assert claims within a particular public agency, the head of the local
central labor body is likely to enter as a mediator where he would not
if a private employer were involved. For mixed reasons, then, organized
labor inclines to an inordinate involvement in the questions of public
employee labor relations, and with others to an acceptance of basic differ-
ences as opposed to the private sector.
Individual unions whose membership is traditionally in private em-
ployment, for example in the building trades, have maintained a hybrid
relationship with public employers in behalf of appropriate public em-
ployees who perform the work of the craft union, and who might have
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been referred to the full-time public job by the union's agent. Such
unions have been ill-prepared to cope with modern demands for standard
bargaining relationships. Consider, for example, the public agency that
employs full-time journeymen, all of whom were members of the union
at the time they were hired, and who continue to pay union dues in the
traditional way-through the window at the union office. No demand
has been made of the public employer that he "check-off" dues; all mem-
bers of the skilled local pay dues personally. Instead of a bargaining
relationship, the union in conjunction with other crafts had earlier suc-
ceeded in persuading city council to adopt an ordinance which guaran-
tees to craftsmen employed by the city a "prevailing" wage rate; that is,
a wage fixed at a certain percentage of the pay rate negotiated by the
union and the construction industry for the particular skill in private
employment. Adjustments in wages are thus automatic; a letter to the
city personnel department suffices. In the absence of a formal prevail-
ing rate ordinance, the situation might require an actual meeting between
the union agent and someone in city hall. But, "bargaining" was not
expected to be very complicated. In such cities as Chicago, San Francisco
and Cleveland, the public jurisdiction was carved to encompass more
than the craft unions.
In such situations, frequently employees were referred by the union,
or were expected to later join the union as an informal condition of em-
ployment. Although there were few contracts, rare strikes, and little col-
lective bargaining, the arrangement ironically did provide often for a de
facto union shop, and even a closed shop. National Labor Relations
Board coverage of course would outlaw the latter. There are two edges
to the blade that carefully separates out the public service. The exclusion
that denies rights to the weak may very well give license to the strong.
Another set of essentially private unions has a keen interest in the
unique character of public service labor relations. Unionists in the de-
fense industries, particularly employees of those firms whose business is
entirely with government, are very sensitive to the thin line that sepa-
rates them from outright public employment. To nuclear, aerospace and
weapons workers the old union refrain "Which Side Are You On?" car-
ries special meaning as they contemplate growing demands that public
corporations take over the private firms which now operate defense pro-
duction for the Federal Government. Similarly, workers employed by
private transit, gas, electric and communications utilities are from time
to time threatened with public operation.
The prospect of "going public" is usually enough to precipitate panic
among the employees involved, for the immediate expectation is a loss of
union and political rights. Because of the virtually unchallenged conven-
tional wisdom that public employment is by definition "different,"
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workers almost always react negatively to proposals that would convert
private enterprise to public operation.
When sick transit systems, for example, are dumped onto the public
lap, the employees are frequently deprived of the rights they enjoyed as
private workers. A few years ago the Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-
CIO, held a collective bargaining agreement with the then privately
operated bus line in Dade County (Miami) Florida. Included in the
contract, of course, was the right to strike; the employees were covered
by the NLRB. The franchise was returned to the County for operation
and the workers automatically became county employees. But Florida
state law prohibits state and local government from recognizing unions
that assert the right to strike. Dade County thereupon refused to recog-
nize the Transit Union which had held bargaining rights for the same
workers for many years. And of course an "illegal" strike erupted.
It is hardly surprising that the leaders and members of labor organiza-
tions in transportation and communications are extremely wary of sug-
gestions to transfer transit, telephone and airline services to public owner-
ship. They equate public employment, as do those unionists described
earlier, with second class citizenship. They are fully aware that even in
the few states and in the federal service where public employees do have
the protected right to join unions of their choosing, such laws relegate
public workers to a condition that is always separate and consequently
never equal. Workers in the border-line industries tend as a result to
swell the ranks of Americans who look at their governments with less than
full confidence. Tragically, socially useful proposals that organized
labor should normally be expected to support, run the risk of incurring
labor's enmity.
John Kenneth Galbraith, in testimony before a Senate subcommittee
in the spring of 1969, urged in the public interest that firms such as Gen-
eral Dynamics and Lockheed be made public corporations since almost
their entire business is with the Federal Government. In the New York
Times Magazine of November 16, 1969, Galbraith further encouraged
the Democratic Party to make this proposal a plank of the Party's 1972
platform. But, in issuing this challenge to Democratic Party liberals,
whose recent "respectability" he decries, Galbraith himself succumbs to
the conventional wisdom regarding the rights of public employees. He
writes in the Times: ."By pretending that these essentially public firms are
really private ... we leave them free to engage in a good deal of lobby-
ing and other political activity ... by men who for practical purposes, are
public employees." Such political freedom is denied by the Hatch Act to
public employees, and Galbraith apparently feels that employees of the
firms in question really are public employees and therefore should be re-
stricted as such. He does not contest the wisdom that relegates millions
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of American public workers to second class political status, nor does he
in his article betray any sensitivity to the dear and present implications
that his proposal will also divest the employees of their economic and
trade union rights. "By pretending that these firms are really private
... we leave them free to engage in a good deal of [he might have added
union] activity ... by men who... are public employees." As read by the
unionized employees of Lockheed, Galbraith calls for the reduction of
their political and economic rights, and thus assures the opposition of
their union to any such plank in the Democratic platform. A rational,
socially useful suggestion is doomed, partly at least because practically all
of us, including Galbraith, accept as revealed truth the doctrine that
public employment is "different."
Recent efforts to alter the public character of the Federal postal ser-
vice have to some extent played on the very fears described in the fore-
going, but with a reverse twist. Advocates of a postal corporation had
hinted to postal employee unions that certain, if not all, of the trade un-
ion rights of private workers might be available if the postal service were
converted to corporate status. Not the right to strike, of course, but,
perhaps the right to bargain for the union shop? The postal organiza-
tions were indeed tempted by the prospect of union security contracts.
The union shop and the agency shop, as well as the right to strike, are
not presently being considered for Federal employees. Yet, in testimony
given before a House Committee, Postmaster General Winton M. Blount
said that under a postal corporation, union and management should
have the right to negotiate a union shop contract. After all, he might have
added, employees of the Bell System, Western Union and Railway Ex-
press, all postal service competitors, are protected in their labor rights
(including the right to strike). Why not the Postal Corporation, at
least in the area of union security?
Why do some unions composed entirely of public employees appear to
be generally satisfied with a system of "separate but equal" rights? If there
is near unanimity among Americans that public employment is differ-
ent, then we should not be surprised that many public employees also
share this view, or that their unions are content to fight for separate
legislation. Perhaps we should seek additional answers, to ask the ques-
tion: Are there hidden values in separation that attract public workers
and their unions? If so, what are they, and do they really justify the
retention of a segregated system?
We have been warned that the "gap" in our labor law system "per-
mits the public to be savagely victimized by ruthless labor barons. .. ."
The Scripps-Howard logic seemed to run this way: "If the National La-
bor Relations Board had jurisdiction, the New York City transit strike
could have been enjoined for eighty days, and during this cooling-off
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period a fact-finding panel would surely have helped the parties to find
peaceful solutions." Rational enough; but implied is an otherwise total
absence of legal restraint upon the power of the "ruthless labor barons."
New York State, however, had taken precautions to protect the public in-
terest against the effects of such strikes. Twenty years earlier, in 1947, the
Condon-Wadlin Act was passed, prohibiting strikes by public employees
anywhere in the State of New York. Loss of job and reinstatement rights
was the basic penalty. The Governor, a few months prior to the illegal
transit stoppage, defended the state statute as an effective deterrent
against impairment of vital public services. However, the law was not
invoked during the transit strike. When the strike finally ended, the
governor asked the legislature to enact special legislation exempting the
striking workers from the "deterring" penalties of the no-strike law which
the workers had dearly violated. The legislature complied. In effect,
then, a gap has been created, both in substance and credibility.
It has been said that law which fails to command general respect,
indeed that is often the object of contempt, is worse than no law at all.
For one such piece of legislation saps the entire legal system of strength
and stature. Clearly, no-strike laws do not deter strikes; if anything,
they incite them. Such laws are inconsistently applied, and tend to en-
courage irresponsibility among those against whom the laws are osten-
sibly directed.
Repression, discrimination, segregation produce responses that run
the gamut from the defiant to the devious. Public strikes, because they
are illegal, seem somehow to "happen." Unlike the industrial model
which is thoroughly structured on both sides, the public employee stop-
page often comes unannounced, follows no set rules, has no concept of
duration attached to it, and is guerrilla in its tactics. Because judges
stand ready to grant total injunctions in advance of a stoppage, the plan
of attack usually involves the element of surprise. The "event" is called
a 'sick day," or "Blue flu," or a "study day," and is designed to harass
as it also circumvents the strictures of no-strike statutes. The net effect
is to mitigate the employee's income loss and the threat to his job se-
curity. Because repressive laws are virtually unworkable (how do you
fire and replace one thousand or ten thousand garbagemen?) public man-
agement finds itself rationalizing its failure to invoke the penalties of
the law by joining in the charade which defines the "event" as something
other than a "strike." Workers participating in such an "action" or
"event" have been known to receive pay for their time off the job be-
cause the employer insisted that his employees were not in violation of
the no-strike law, and that therefore neither was he in violation for
refusing to invoke the penalties of the law. Where an event is billed in-
formally as a "sick day," workers honoring the sick call have claimed
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and received sick pay for the day or days away from the job. 'Where pic-
ket lines are thrown up, sometimes manned by off-duty employees, those
who have honored the line have on occasion been paid on the plea that
they feared to cross the picket line. This latter phenomenon suggests that
the union need only place a lone picket (who may or may not be an em-
ployee of the affected agency) at the entrance, arrange for all others
to call in their assorted fears and thus get paid for the day, while also
assuring a profitable and successful "event." Garbagemen, teachers and
others who work on the task system, recognize that time lost in a work
stoppage probably will be made up, and with it lost income suffered
by the employees. In fact, sanitationmen, for example, can expect to work
considerable overtime--perhaps at premium overtime rates.
It appears that repressive no-strike laws establish a permissive atmos-
phere of creative evasion in which the fear of income and job loss is mini-
mized, and in which the employer indeed sometimes actively colludes.
In the process, the dignity and at least the small sense of sacrifice that
should attend a conscious act of civil disobedience, are lacking. What's
more, the heavy responsibility implicit in the structured strike is also
avoided.
Paradoxically, one may argue that the unfettered right to strike is in
itself a greater strike deterrent than laws that prohibit strikes. Where the
union is secure and legally protected in its right to strike, the employer,
aware of his own power to influence the strike decision, can be expected to
exercise great sensitivity toward the bargaining process. Analogous is the
confrontation of two strong powers in international relations, each aware
of and restrained by the capability of the other. No-strike laws, on the
other hand, tend to make the employer dull to the danger signals, thus
enhancing the likelihood of a bargaining breakdown. Aside from the
influence of the other party, there are internal compulsions at work
among union members that markedly affect the strike decision. Except
for the rare national emergency strike which may be arbitrarily halted
through National Labor Relations Board or Railway Labor Act injunction,
stoppages in private industry are understood by the parties to end when
voluntary agreement is reached. In this setting, both sides face a strike
situation fully aware that the strength of each is to be put to the test.
The workers know that they will make two critical decisions: they will
vote to begin the strike and they will vote to end it. In the interim, for
as long as the strike lasts, the workers' income will suffer and the employ-
er's ability to produce or provide service will be curtailed. But, the strike
will end when the workers and the employer voluntarily come to terms.
It will not end because a law says it must terminate, or because a politi-
cian screams "treason," or because a judge bans all picketing, or because
the press demands a return to work. Exclusive responsibility rests with
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the workers and their employer. Nobody takes the parties off the "hook,"
not even the Federal mediator. By definition, it's for the duration. Un-
certainty of the "duration" is the factor that weighs heavily in the deadly
serious business of conducting a strike.
The decision to strike must then be a personally responsible one, for
the responsibility of ending the strike will not be assigned elsewhere.
It remains where it began-with the worker. If this is so, is it not rea-
sonable to assume that the unrestricted right to strike carries as a corol-
lary the restraining influence of personal responsibility for the conse-
quences and for subsequent decisions? And is this not a healthier situa-
tion, for the individual and for society, than that in which the restricted
right induces an aura of personal irresponsibility?
The circumstances surrounding the celebrated "study day" of Mon-
treal police last October 7 make for an excellent case in point. Cana-
dian law prohibits strikes by police and firefighters. There are no auto-
matic penalties, however, in the event of illegal strike. The pattern
where strikes are banned is familiar enough. In the summer of 1967
Montreal police accepted a less than satisfactory wage settlement on the
mayor's plea that the city's Expo '67 not be jeopardized, and on the
promise that adequate reward would be forthcoming. That contract left
Montreal police, a well-trained and necessarily bi-lingual force, almost
$2000 per year behind their Toronto colleagues. Montreal negotiations
in 1969 led finally to a fact-finding recommendation in early October that
would raise the Montreal average to $8480 annually, still significantly to
the rear of Toronto. A mass meeting to "study" the award was called
the morning of October 7, 1969. The Mayor of Montreal, confident that
the fact-finder's award would be accepted, happened to be in St. Louis,
Missouri, on a trade mission. At their meeting, the policemen voted to
immediately go into an extended "study session." Instructive here is an
interview with one of the "students" who, according to Gerald Clark's
account in the New York Times Magazine of November 16, 1969, "...
reminiscing later said he was hoping the decision to settle ...would be
taken from him. He was sure . .. the government would compel the
strikers to go back to work, or that prominent industrialists would per-
suade municipal authorities to offer improvement." In his article, "When
The Police Strike," Clark reports that the Quebec legislature did quickly
threaten fines and loss of union recognition, and the "study session"
ended by overwhelming vote just seventeen hours after it began. Bar-
gaining resumed, and two weeks later accord was reached on a new
contract that increased annual pay to $8750. The pact was hailed by un-
ion spokesmen as at last providing parity with Toronto. But, it was
stimulated by a 17-hour work stoppage by policemen who had no legal
right to strike. Questions must be asked: Would the acknowledged
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right to strike in this admittedly crucial case have in fact assured the
same result without the need for the strike to take place? Granted the
right to strike, would the mayor have been out of the country at so
sensitive a moment in collective bargaining as when the fact-finder's
wage award is to be announced? Would the police, without warning,
have taken the desperate step as they did? Would the recognized right to
strike have assured a heightened sense of responsibility on both sides?
It may very well devolve upon unsophisticated, inept public employers
to finally destroy our dual, segregated systems of labor relations. Pecu-
liarly, while other democratic nations debate the desirability of convert-
ing private enterprise to public, our tendency except for sick transit seems
to run in the opposite direction. Public employers, hemmed in by civil
service, frustrated by supervisory problems, buffeted by community pres-
sures, pulled by politicians, pushed by public employee unions, restricted
by non-existent or unworkable labor relations statutes, often seek to run
away from their problems rather than try to solve them. A "runaway
shop" is one thing; who ever heard of a "runaway government"?
In desperation some public employers have thrown up their hands,
thrown in the towel, and have sought simply to turn over public services
to private enterprise. Notwithstanding Lincoln Steffens' admonition
about public enterprise and private greed, many cities do contract out
their garbage disposal; schools and universities and hospitals contract
their food services and custodial work. Indeed, the City of New York
has turned over its hospitals, patients and all, to private operators. We
know of the measure to convert the Postal Service into a postal corporation.
In some instances, dual public-private systems of labor relations co-exist
side by side, graphically posing our problem. To illustrate, two employees
at Ohio State University perform precisely the same custodial work, but in
adjacent buildings. One is a public employee hired by the university; the
other is employed by a private contractor. The private employee belongs to
a union, the Service Employees International Union, which is certified by
the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive bargaining agent for
all employees of the contractor. That union, and the employee, are free to
strike and to negotiate a union shop contract. The public employee may, if
he chooses, belong to the American Federation of State, County and Mu-
nicipal Employees, which is recognized by the University but only indirectly
as the bargaining agent. There is no unit and no union shop; and of course
the right to strike is prohibited. The public employee is covered by an
"Understanding" reached by AFSCME and the University and verified by
an exchange of signed letters. The private employee is covered by a legally
enforceable contract. This public employer is doing through an agent-
the private contractor-what he insists he may not do as public employer.
Having divested himself of labor problems by the simple expedient of
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making them private, the public employer no longer need be concerned
with such irritants as the right of public employees to strike, their right
to union security and their right to contract. Inasmuch as private em-
ployees do enjoy these rights, uncomplicated by the fantasy world that
surrounds public employment, perhaps the answer is to convert all pub-
lic services into private enterprise. After all, there are private teachers,
private police, private utilities, private bus drivers, private garbagemen,
private fire fighters, even a mercenary military. "Why not," one asks,
"throw out the public baby with the dirty bathwater ?"
On the other hand, someone may simply suggest that the sovereign
divest himself, not of responsibility, but of the myth, tradition and frus-
tration; that he step down from the throne dad in modern dress, pre-
pared to adapt himself to the contemporary needs of public management,
and like his private counterpart, in fact proceed to manage.
It is in the best interests of public management, of public employees
and their unions, and of the general public that a rational, responsible,
unified labor law system be established.
'Yet, in the United States, we religiously insist upon segregated, less
than equal systems of regulating labor relations in the public service in
those states that have thus far acted in this field, and in the Federal serv-
ice. The Kennedy Executive Order No. 10988, modified on October
29, 1969, has not yet been elevated to law. It prescribes the bargaining
rights and responsibilities of Federal workers and management, but
limits severely the scope of action of the parties. Understandably, inas-
much as it bears the signature of the employer, the Executive Order bans
the strike and union security. Among the states, only Hawaii and Penn-
sylvania have now taken the step to legitimize the strike in public service
through enactment of a statute dealing specifically with public employees.
Ten more states-Connecticut, Deleware, Massachusetts, Michigan,
New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin-
have mandatory bargaining laws exclusively for state and/or local gov-
ernment employees. Three others-Alaska, Missouri, and New Hamp-
shire-permit collective bargaining, but impose no penalties for refusal to
grant recognition or for failure to bargain in good faith. California and
Minnesota simply allow the parties to 'meet and confer." Other states
have not acted in the public employee field at all, or have adopted only
minor legislation dealing with the right to join a union and to present
grievances. Thirty states have enacted some legislation in this area. In
a few states, the laws affecting public employees are similar to those cov-
ering labor relations in the intrastate private sector; but, in none are
public employees included for coverage purposes under laws dealing
with private workers.
The prescription to apply liberal (or perhaps conservative) doses of
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the national labor law to public employee labor relations may have been
motivated by the same negative considerations which for so many years
resulted in exclusion and segregation for public workers. But, unioni-
zation having taken place despite exclusion, some candidly call for Na-
tional Labor Relations Board application now if only to control the "ex-
cesses of the labor bosses" in the public service. The net result, quite
apart from motivation, does demand sober study. Why not extend the
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board to all state and local
employment?
We can dispose quickly of the constitutional question and move on to
the merits of the argument. The U.S. Supreme Court in Maryland v.
Wlirtz,- held in June, 1968 that the Congress has the authority to extend
the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and local govern-
ment functions. Public enterprise, if Congress so determines, may be
construed according to the same criteria as apply to private enterprise. If
this be so, the legal argument against extension of the National Labor
Relations Board is demolished.
Historically, the Federal government has involved itself in state and
local labor matters by means other than mandatory legislation. There
is a considerable body of precedent in this regard, most of it accumulated
by way of the "grant-in-aid" device. Prior to the Fair Labor Standards
case, federal personnel standards were imposed on state and local govern-
ments as a direct condition of financial grants by the Federal Govern-
ment. The Hatch Act restricts and sets standards for the political activity
of Federal employees. These standards automatically apply also to em-
ployees at the state and local level whose duties are in connection with
an activity financed in whole or in part by Federal loans or grants. True,
as in all grant programs, the state agency need not accept Federal funds
and thereby choose to escape the personnel regulation. But, the facts of
finance being what they are, it is indeed a rare unit of government that
today will rise above interest to safeguard the principle. State employees
whose performance involves employment services, mental health or wel-
fare programs must be recruited and retained on the basis of merit if the
state is to share in Federal funding of these services. In addition,
Federal qualifications and job content standards must in certain instances,
as for Social Workers, be met. Permissive legislation has been adopted
by the Congress which, if applied by the states, would extend such bene-
fits as Social Security and unemployment compensation to state and local
employees. Until the recent FLSA case, it was assumed that the Congress
could legislate for state and local employees only on a permissive basis,
and then through the state government exclusively. But, there had been
hints prior to the FLSA case that Congress was prepared to chisel away
2392 U.S. 183 (1968).
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at the state's rights barrier. Congress, in the Civil Rights and the Eco-
nomic Opportunity Acts of 1964, covered under the former the clearly
intrastate "greasy spoon" restaurant, and via the latter had carved out
a grant-in-aid short-cut to the cities that bypassed the state governments.
Although the states have won back politically their position in the anti-
poverty program, the right of Congress to deal directly with the cities
has not been constitutionally upset.
The Federal incursion into state and local government has been char-
acterized by a concern for nationwide standards that are intelligible and
uniform. Typically, the power of the Federal purse has been the lever in
inducing, sometimes seducing, the cooperation of state and local govern-
ment. This has certainly been the case where employment standards
were sought. Fourth of July devotion to civil service merit notwithstand-
ing, most states would not have emerged, even to a limited extent, from
the patronage system which "made their parties great," if not for essen-
tial standards imposed by the Federal Government. A basic uniformity
in state standards is generally thought to be desirable; and if this be so in
personnel matters, then we should examine carefully the avenues feasible
and desirable for effectuating uniformity in standards governing labor-
management relations in the public service.
The grant-in-aid technique has been extensively used in applying the
Hatch Act and the merit system. Do we have available to us a Federal
formula for labor relations that may be similarly imposed as a useful
condition for Federal grants and loans? Federal employee labor rela-
tions are governed by Executive Order 10988 as initially authorized in
1962 by John F. Kennedy and amended in 1969 by President Nixon. The
Congress could be urged to require as a condition of all future grants
that the grant recipient agree to apply the Executive Order on labor
relations to the recipient's own labor-management problems. This may
be unrealistic inasmuch as Congress has thus far failed to enact a Federal
employee labor relations law, choosing to leave the matter in the hands
of the Chief Executive. Further, the machinery created by the Executive
for designating bargaining units, conducting elections, and resolving im-
passes is entirely inadequate to cope with the demands that would be
exerted from the much more numerous state and local services. The
Federal Civil Service Commission does handle non-Federal violations of
the Hatch Act; but, the problems of labor relations are far more intricate.
However, within the Federal establishment there are other administrative
devices that might be useful if tied in with the grant-in-aid. The Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service, designed to ease if not entirely head
off collisions in the private sector, is regionally structured and thus
could be available in labor disputes in state and local employment. The
Service does not have authority at present to enter a public dispute of its
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own volition, nor may it become involved if only one party to the public
conflict makes the request. By administrative order, Federal mediators
do enter public labor disputes if both sides request assistance. The law is
silent on the subject. Unfortunately the public bargaining process
does not normally anticipate the constructive use of Federal mediation.
For example, the private sector requirement of formal notice to Federal
mediation when bargaining reaches a crucial stage does not apply to pub-
lic bargaining. Thus, proposals for Federal mediation in public bar-
gaining usually come at the moment of crisis when the parties are so sen-
sitive and so hardened in their positions that neither is inclined to show
the weakness that may be associated with even the slightest favorable nod
in the direction of third-party aid. Conceivably, a grant-in-aid condition
could be the insistence that state and local government take the initia-
tive in seeking Federal mediation involvement whenever a strike (or what-
ever it is called) is threatened, or that public management attempt to in-
clude in labor agreements (or whatever they are called) the automatic
and joint request for Federal mediation when bargaining reaches a pre-
viously specified date, for example, thirty days prior to contract termina-
tion. These, of course, are last moment, fire-brigade devices, and although
obviously important in the broad bargaining range, do not at all guaran-
tee the basic preventive techniques without which sane labor relations
are difficult if not impossible. On the assumption that we do seek or-
derly, peaceful and equitable labor relations in public employment, it
seems necessary that we look beyond the grant-in-aid device to achieve
our goal. In now pursuing the question of direct application of the
National Labor Relations Board to state and local labor relations, we ought
to determine whether the states under any circumstances are capable of
fulfilling the required functions.
Implicit in the passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935
was the notion that the economy of the nation transcended state lines,
that workers merited protection of their basic rights whether they toiled
in Mississippi or Michigan, and that uniform standards of labor relations
were desirable. Narrow definitions at the time served to exclude mil-
lions of wage-earners, without however prejudicing the principle im-
plied in the Act. Thirty-five years have gone by, and a minority of states
have set up their own labor relations machinery for public employees, all
within the past ten years. They variously provide for an administrative
board, composed of appointees of the governor, with varying authority to
establish rules covering bargaining units and exclusions, election and certi-
fication of bargaining agents, unfair labor practices, and methods of re-
solving disputes. These state statutes, with two exceptions, ban the strike
and impose varying penalties on worker, union and union officer for viola-
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tion of the no-strike prohibition. The statutes and/or administrative
rules may also circumscribe the area that is deemed negotiable.
If uniformity is indeed desirable, what has been the experience among
the states? Have they in fact sought to adhere to a standard labor rela-
tions structure as comprehensive statutes are considered, or is the ten-
dency separatist and confusing--or even innovative? Justice Holmes
contended that the states are our social laboratories, that novel ideas
can be tested first in one state and then in others before general accept-
ance permits of national application. This has been true in legislation
affecting minimum wages and maximum hours of work, of unemploy-
ment compensation, and of the labor of women and children. When
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 1842 enacted a statute prohibiting
children under the age of twelve from working more than ten hours a
day, it marked the beginning in the United States of such state experi-
ments that culminated almost a century later in the Federal Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938. Federal action undoubtedly would have occurred
much earlier if not for adverse rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court. The
Owen-Keating Act of 1916, which forbade interstate shipment of goods
on which children under fourteen had worked, was voided in 1918 by a
5-4 vote of the Court. It was not until 1941 that the Supreme Court
finally upheld the right of the Congress to act in this field. It should be
noted here that the American Federation of Labor, although it consis-
tently supported state action, until 1933 opposed Federal action regarding
such matters as hours of work and unemployment compensation. Frank-
lin Roosevelt's New Deal softened the suspicion that characterized organ-
ized labor's earlier attitude toward the Federal Government. The intran-
sigence of the courts and the reluctance of labor served to inhibit the
early passage of Federal legislation, and the reaction of private employ-
ers was of course negative. But the states, too, tended to perform in
ambiguous fashion in this field. Very few states served as "social labora-
tories;" most were content to keep private enterprise happy within their
state boundaries. Most states in order to seduce and placate industry,
failed to legislate in behalf of the social welfare of their own citizens,
and also worked hard to prevent the Federal Government from filling
the gap left by their own dereliction. The Congress finally, and as a
last resort, acted precisely because most states, resting complacently on
their respective sovereignties, neglected their obligations. Squeals of an-
guish emanating from assorted state houses about 'state's rights" do not
erase the fact that "state's responsibilities" have been grossly ignored.
In the matter of public employee labor relations, it appears that the
overwhelming majority of states, despite the admonitions of the 1967
National Governors Conference, will continue to default. The handful
that previously showed experimental zeal seem now to be locked in a
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self-defeating contest to determine which can construct the most ingenious
set of repressive penalties against strikes. The state laboratories are now en-
gaged in the creation of monsters. One of the more renowned scientists,
Dr. Taylor, the father of the New York State Frankenstein, has now publicly
renounced his own offspring. Competition among the states has deteriorated
to the point that in the public labor relations field production is now confined
to hybrid beasts which bear less and less similarity to each other. Still less
do those state products conform to a desirable standard.
For example, assume that we are considering the "private-public"
status of transit systems in Cincinnati, Ohio; Miami, Florida; and New
York City, New York. For our purposes, all three are currently operated
through private franchise. Each has an exclusive bargaining agent certi-
fied for a specified unit as the result of a secret ballot election conducted
by the National Labor Relations Board. A contract exists in each juris-
diction which provides for binding arbitration of grievances and contains
a no-strike clause for the life of the Agreement. The right to strike is
protected by national law and may be asserted at contract termination.
The three systems are now returned to the city or other appropriate politi-
cal sub-division. Let's see what happens.
The Cincinnati transit operation, now public, may or may not, de-
pending upon its exact municipal status, be subject to all or some state
laws affecting public employees. The Ohio Supreme Court in recent
years has ruled that charter cities such as Cincinnati are governed by
the constitution of the state and by the charter of the city. State law does
not necessarily take precedence. However, in Hagermann v. Dayton,3
decided by the Ohio Supreme Court in 1947, it was held that unions had
no legitimacy in the civil service. The home rule city of Cincinnati, with
virtually no guidelines to follow, has in fact established by ordinance a
policy of union recognition and collective bargaining. Without ques-
tion, upon becoming public the employees are automatically deprived of
their right to strike. Further, the city of Cincinnati would not approve
of a union security clause that requires union membership or the payment
of a service fee as a condition of employment. That would have to go.
Also, Cincinnati does not accept the principle of final and binding arbi-
tration of grievances, nor does it consider its collective bargaining docu-
ments to be legally enforceable contracts. But, the city's intentions are
honorable; good faith is the order of the day. The "contract," now en-
cased in quotes, and of course modified as required, will limp on. The
union has retained its exclusive bargaining rights, at least for the time
being. As termination date nears, assume that the mechanics employed
by the transit system sign up with the mythical Independent Order of
Master Machinists. The IOMM seeks recognition for a mechanics' unit.
3 147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.X.2d 246 (1947).
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Unfortunately, the city has no rules or machinery to resolve disputes
over the scope of a bargaining unit, over subsequent modifications of the
unit, over the validity of majority claims, over unfair practices and over
the impasse in negotiations. But the mechanics are threatening to walk
out if their unit is denied. How and by whom will the decision to sever
or not to sever be made? Will an ad hoc third party, as in arbitration,
be hastily summoned? If this is contemplated, must all principals in the
dispute agree to the identity of the impartial judge? We have only two
labor organizations and the employer in this case. It could be worse.
Assuming that the third party method is somehow implemented, what is
the likelihood of continuity in the future disposition of similar cases?
Bargaining finally begins with the union that formerly held contract
rights. The union leadership is especially truculent because of the suspi-
don that the city aided the "rump" organization which sought to divide
the unit. No unfair labor practice charge was filed against the employer
because there is no processing machinery available. Irritated, the man-
agement committee storms out of the negotiating session. Again, no
agency exists to require that the parties bargain in good faith. If an
impasse is reached in the bargaining process, help can be sought from
the Federal Mediation Service only if the parties mutually request it.
Neither the State of Ohio nor the City of Cincinnati is capable of pro-
viding mediation machinery. Even if the City could, should a theoreti-
cally impartial mediating agent appointed by the mayor, who is ulti-
mately the employer, be acceptable to the union?
The Cincinnati case is current. There exists much sentiment among
public officials, and within the union, favoring public ownership. But,
the union will not support a public takeover unless assured adequate safe-
guards. In anticipation, the union sent lobbyists to the state legislature in
January, 1969 in behalf of a bill that would guarantee retention of
trade union rights in the event the Cincinnati Transit System were to go
public. The bill was buried in committee because the state legislative
and administrative leadership wanted no legislation at all on the subject
of public employee labor relations. Finally, more than one year later, the
Ohio General Assembly enacted a statute which required a public author-
ity to assume all the employer's obligations under any existing labor con-
tract, and further preserved rights, benefits and privileges under existing
collective bargaining agreements. Otherwise, Ohio law on this vital sub-
ject continues to sum up in the non sequitur: Under no circumstances may
Ohio public employees strike; they have only a questionable right to join
unions; they may have their union dues deducted from the payroll by the
public employer.
The Miami-Dade County transit system, prior to going public, was
organized by the Amalgamated Transit Union. Protected by the National
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Labor Relations Board, the union succeeded in negotiating a contract
which of course asserted the right to strike. Florida's "right to work"
law prohibited a union shop clause in the contract. Dade County took
over the system, and the workers became county employees. Under Flor-
ida law all public employees have the right to union membership, may
present proposals to their public employers, but may not strike. Oddly
enough, among county employees in Florida only Fire Department em-
ployees are legally entitled to collective bargaining. Others, including
the now publicly employed bus drivers, are only permitted to do so. The
Transit Union, jarred by this combination of legal blows, was literally
counted out by a ruling which prohibited public employers from granting
recognition to any organization whose constitution, local or national, did
not renounce the right to strike. An independent, perhaps more com-
pliant, association today represents the Dade County transit employees.
In New York City transit is largely publicly owned. Public transit
workers are denied the right to strike, while their private counterparts are
of course protected in that right. Unlike Ohio and Florida, New York
is one of the few states to have experimented with comprehensive legisla-
tion. Thus, there exists machinery to facilitate the establishment of units,
to certify bargaining agents, to aid in the settlement of disputes, and to
penalize strikes and strikers. New York City has its own office of Col-
lective Bargaining which antedates the state statute. The New York tran-
sit situation differs from the examples previously cited in that the New
York City union continues to have its rights protected, except for the right
to strike. Although this is an all-important deprivation, it does not add
testimony at this juncture to the fact of non-uniformity of conditions
among the states. On the contrary, if there is consistency at all, it is in
this ubiquitous stricture against the strike.
It is important, because it provides graphic witness to the untenability
of our labor policies, to examine as has been done here the "transvestite"
enterprise-one that readily sheds its private for public garb, and vice
versa. But, it would be unwise to assume that problems exist only at
the edges that tentatively and nervously separate the public and private
sectors of our economy. Public employment is too big a factor in its own
right to be without influence on the general labor scene. In a democracy
any system of rules and values that arbitrarily excludes fifteen percent
of its potential participants must be injured to an important degree. Ever
increasing mobility among workers that carries them into and out of the
excluded public category surely has the effect of confusing the authority
of rules imposed in both the majority and minority areas. As the public
sector inevitably grows in relation to the whole labor force, and its work-
ers continue to organize with or without the sanction of law, we run the
risk of eventually developing two competing bodies of administrative law
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dealing with essentially the saree labor relations problems. One of course
is based on National Labor Relations Board doctrine. The other threatens
to be a patchwork composed of the rulings of agencies created by some
states, but much more often of ad hoc decisions by third parties selected at
random crisis points, the rulings of judges in specific common law situa-
tions, and the opinions of attorneys-general, and based on all of these a
topsy-like spate of arbitration cases already characterized conveniently as
"cases in public employment." Parkinson will have prevailed when the
American Arbitration Association sets up separate panels for public em-
ployee cases. We are farther along than many realize in the piece-meal
growth of this boot-leg, other-world of labor relations. Some states may
have legitimized themselves by enacting mandatory or permissive bargain-
ing laws; but this does not take into account the vast number of political
subdivisions in all states which, subjected to labor pressures, adopted some
form of collective bargaining system despite the absence of state law. The
combinations of form and substance in public labor relations in such
states are as a result already extremely complex. For those states that have
not yet preempted the field, it may indeed be too much to expect that
they now act. A state like Ohio, with no experience in coping impartially
with labor-management relations, public or private, must by now be over-
whelmed by the prospect of creating elaborate machinery designed to
regulate its public labor problems. Despite the fact that public employees
in Ohio do not have the legal authorization to organize and bargain col-
lectively, thousands upon thousands at all levels of government do be-
long to labor organizations which do bargain collectively in their behalf.
Signed agreements, known by whatever euphemism, exist in the state,
county, municipal and school services. Frequently there are no limitations
imposed on the breadth of the bargaining unit or on the level of super-
vision eligible for union membership and/or coverage under an agree-
ment. The agency shop has been negotiated in a few jurisdictions.
Union security through twelve months' check-off authorization is becom-
ing popular. Exclusive bargaining rights have been granted directly or
indirectly by state, county and local agencies. The options seem to vary
consistently with the number of jurisdictions involved. "State law-who
needs it?", some ask. Perhaps a state law is not needed, but uniformity
surely is.
The American Arbitration Association has rushed into the breach, of-
fering its Center for Disputes Settlement as a means of resolving public
employee problems in the states where no legal machinery exists. Noting
that some "thirty-seven states" are without bargaining laws, Center Dir-
ector Willoughby Abner told the Federal Bar Association in May, 1969,
that "it isn't our intention to compete with existing agencies provided for
by law." Abner stated that the Center is prepared to determine appropri-
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ate bargaining units, conduct representation elections, mediate impasses
and provide arbitrators in grievance cases. If the Center were equipped
to handle the labor problems of thirty-seven states, and if a thousand
pragmatic precedents were not already set in those states mainly because
they lack law, one could almost with equanimity anticipate a measure of
success for the Center in bringing reason and uniformity to the labor re-
lations of a substantial segment of the public sector. Unfortunately,
the Center has neither the means, the manpower nor the mandate to ac-
complish its task.
It is arguable, in the interests of impartiality, that Center machinery
should be preferred to the third party involvement of a state or munci-
pal agency. Some cities, particularly where the state is without a general
labor relations agency, have established their own labor-management com-
mittees. These are usually composed of equal numbers representing
labor, management and the public, and are normally appointed by the
mayor. The function of the committee is the same as outlined above for
the Center for Disputes Settlement, but has historically been intended to
handle disputes in the private sector, especially those outside the purview
of federal law. Hotel disputes were early targets of such local commit-
tees. When public workers, including even those employed by the city,
began to organize, municipalities that had labor-management committees
tended to use the committees as the means of heading off conflict. Even
though the mayor was the employer and the man responsible for appoint-
ing the members of the committee, labor members of the committee
often prevailed upon the public employee union to accept the committee
as an "impartial" third party. Organized labor understandably accepts
the role of the mayor, the governor or the president as the logical official
to appoint members of the boards that are responsible for administering
labor relations agencies. The top public officials at the three levels of
government are not viewed by labor generally in their capacity as employ-
ers of workers. Thus, where the National Labor Relations Board would
qualify as an impartial body for labor relations in state and local govern-
ment, its role in matters involving federal employees might be suspect,
since National Labor Relations Board members are appointed by the Pres-
ident. Similarly, a board appointed by the governor of a state should
perhaps be considered inappropriate where employees of the state and of
its political subdivisions are affected.
Admittedly, objectivity and impartiality are impossible in public af-
fairs. If they were, by now the computerists would have taken hold and
relieved us mortals of the anguish of decision-making in labor relations.
The best we can accomplish is to strive for fairness, to insert the "dis-
interested" third party between the contending factions, and to do the
utmost in assuring a sense of general confidence in the role of the medi-
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ator and in the institution represented by him. This confidence should
be shared not only by the parties at conflict, but by the public. By defi-
nition, then, we should reject out of hand the concept of mediation
which presumes sole selection directly or indirectly by one of the par-
ties. A labor relations board appointed by the public employer has no
greater right to claim impartiality in disputes that involve that public em-
ployer than a similar board appointed by the president of General Electric
in a labor matter involving GE. An employer is an employer is an em-
ployer. . . . Ameliorative, but not especially impressive, is the practice
of appointing members of state labor boards to terms that exceed those
of the appointing governor, with the proviso that members may be re-
moved only for cause. These suggest greater independence for board
members; but, unfortunately the ability or the willingness of board mem-
bers to withstand the pressures of the man who appointed them is always
suspect. The temptation of a governor to assume certain responses from
his appointees must be a constant consideration for all involved parties.
Even if the governor is not so tempted, the fact that others think he is
simply by virtue of his appointing authority, suffices to damage the integ-
rity of the third party function.
A governor, acting in the role of employer, can be expected because
of political considerations to flirt even more than his private counterpart
at the edges of impropriety in the very sensitive business of labor relations.
For example, if given a choice, any employer, private or public, can be
expected to prefer a more docile rather than a militant labor organiza-
tion as the bargaining agent for his employees. Private employers have
learned after years of experience with a tough task-master, the National
Labor Relations Board, to studiously avoid this kind of unfair labor prac-
tice. A governor, having only to contend with his own board, may as
perhaps happened in 1969 in New York State, extend a helping hand to
a favored organization. Further, unlike private employment, a particular
labor union might have given major support to the governor in his cam-
paign for election, while another backed the loser or simply sat out the
contest. There are strong hints that state board decisions regarding unit
determination and recognition in certain states have been issued in terms
of reward for the governor's friends and punishment for his enemies.
Provable or not, such allegations are common and more important are
believed. Suspicion will persist as long as the public employer has the
power to unilaterally select the "impartial" agency.
State legislators, who may have authority to confirm appointments
of labor board members, and who without question control the agency's
appropriation, can be expected to try to influence the public employee
labor board as the board deals with public agencies within the legislator's
district. Given the poor quality and ethical laxity that abound in our
[Vol. 31
NLRB
state legislatures, and the political if not other forms of susceptibility of
state administrators, the state labor board suffers serious built-in handi-
caps. Of course, if the National Labor Relations Board were applied to
state and local employment, Congressmen could show the same kind of
interest in their districts as I suggest the state legislator evinces. How-
ever, the Congressman is literally more distant from issues of this kind,
his interests are usually more diverse, and in any event his ability to
influence the National Labor Relations Board is negligible. National
Labor Relations Board rulings in specific cases regarding unit recognition,
elections, and certification are not known to be subject to political tam-
pering. The fact that neither the public employer within the state nor
the public employee union has a hand in the appointment of National
Labor Relations Board members provides a setting in which both may have
confidence and in which it is conceivable that a balance may be struck
among the rights of worker, employer and public.
Equity and the balancing of rights are the concern of our national
labor law, indeed of any law. In labor relations the principle applies
equally to private and public circumstances. As we know, a dispute be-
tween private parties may have a far more devastating impact on the pub-
lic interest than an altercation between public employer and public em-
ployees. The question for us centers then on the capacity of present na-
tional law to resolve labor-management disputes without unfairly jeopar-
dizing the essential rights of workers, employer or public. Unless modified,
all references here will be uniformly to private and public labor-manage-
ment relationships, on the assumption that the national labor law should
be extended to labor relations in state and local government.
Equity and balance can best be served first with the requirement that
National Labor Relations Board and Federal Mediation machinery shall
be available only where the parties agree to contract clauses providing
for no-strike, no lock-out, and binding arbitration of all grievances that
arise during the life of the contract. The Federal Government, just as
it now provides free mediation service, should pay for the costs of griev-
ance arbitration. This would reduce if not eliminate jurisdictional and
grievance stoppages, and repair the imbalance that exists in certain major
instances. The General Electric Company, for example, insists that
certain grievances shall not be arbitrated and are therefore subject to set-
tlement by strike. Ironically, the thirteen unions that struck General
Electric in the fall of 1969 were able to do so simultaneously despite
the fact that their contracts terminated on varying dates. Some simply
struck over unresolved grievances, and there were plenty of these. To
further reinforce the basic security of parties to collective bargaining,
that is as long as the law requires the certified agent to represent equally
all employees in the unit, the individual states should not be allowed to
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modify the national law in any respect, including the vital area of union
security. If we are to effectively cope with the public interest dispute, it
is essential that we first take steps to assure the survival of strong, secure
components in the collective bargaining arena. This is so important that
perhaps we ought to go one step beyond the prohibition against state tam-
pering with the labor relations machinery. It may be desirable, in the in-
terests of stability and security, to restore the practice of submitting the
question of the union shop to majority vote of employees in the bargaining
unit. If the majority votes in the affirmative, then the certified union
and management should be compelled to incorporate into their contract a
provision requiring union membership as a condition of employment
during the life of the contract. Thus, the majority union would be re-
quired throughout the contract term, to abide by a no-strike declaration as
it represents equally all employees in the unit; the company would not be
permitted to lock-out its employees over any issue that should arise during
the agreement period; both must accept the award of an impartial arbitra-
tor in all unresolved grievances that occur during the life of the contract;
and all employees in the bargaining unit must join and remain members
of the union for the duration of the stipulated contract period. Govern-
ment, for its part, agrees that during the life of the contract, it will make
available to the parties all of its impartial, problem-solving, peace-
keeping machinery free of charge, including arbitration and mediation
services.
The union shop election was instituted as the result of the 1947 Taft-
Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act. Before the ne-
gotiating parties could legally agree to include such a security clause in
the contract, a majority of employees had to vote in favor in a special bal-
loting separate from the original certification election. The special elec-
tion was deleted from the Act when the record indicated overwhelming
approval of the union shop in election after election. I propose here that
the union shop be required, not simply permitted, where a union has
been designated by the workers for this purpose. In cases of conscientious
objection to membership, an auxiliary system of service fees rather than
dues-the agency shop-could be used. All employees, whether mem-
bers or simple fee-payers, would be bound by the stipulated obligations
for the life of the contract.
Certainly, for public employment, the prohibition against the strike
and the lockout, and the insistence upon arbitration of grievances and
use of mediation services should be acceptable. A hang-up would be the
union shop or agency shop requirement. Can a public employee be legally
or constitutionally compelled, as a condition of employment, to be a
member of a labor organization or at least to pay a service fee to such or-
ganization? We know, of course, that public employees have been, in-
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deed are today, separated from their jobs for failing to maintain member-
ship in a political organization or for refusing to pay the "service fee"
expected by the political organization. Membership by public employees
in labor organizations has also been the subject of concern for some years.
The following excerpts from court decisions deal with the question of
union membership as a condition of employment:
Our conclusion in this respect finds support also in numerous cases sus-
taining the validity of regulations prescribing, as a condition of public em-
ployment, certain restrictions upon rights. .... 4
Whether a rational connection exists (regarding union membership and
continued employment) is a matter of opinion. And the question was ...
for the Board ... to determine. 5
If petitioner's activities had a tendency to create dissension and unrest
among city employees ...it is not for the courts to declare that a dis-
missal ...would be without cause .... 6
[C]ourts may properly hold that there is a reasonable relationship between
the integrity and efficiency of public service and union membership of
public employees .... 7
One city may determine that union recognition results in efficient opera-
tion of its departments; another city may decide that public employees
should have less rights than other citizens. In the present case the police
commissioners and the union have, in effect, declared in advance under
the collective bargaining agreement that union security is a reasonable re-
quirement for the efficient and orderly administration of the police de-
partment. This is a decision they have a right to make.... Our conclu-
sion (is) that this union shop clause, as construed, is valid .... 8
The central question in each case was a rule regarding union membership
as a condition of employment. Except for the final case cited, the require-
ment was that of non-membership in the union. In all cases, according to
the courts, an individual's rights were not violated, nor was the merit sys-
tem imperiled, by rules prohibiting or requiring union membership as a
condition of employment. As the University of Cincinnati Law Review
insists, and Tremblay v. Berlin Police Union reinforces: "[C]ourts may
4 Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council, 94 Cal. App. 2d
36, 48, 210 P.2d 305, 312 (1949).
G Perez v. Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles. 78 Cal. App. 2d 638,
646, 178 P.2d 537, 543 (1947).
OHayman v. City of Los Angeles, 17 Cal. App. 2d 674, 679, 62 P.2d 1047, 1049 (1936).
M. Seasongood and IL L Barrow, Unionization of Public Employees, 21 U. CIN. L REV.
327, 346 (1952).
STremblay v. Berlin Police Union 237 A.2d. 668 (Sup. Cr. New Hampshire, 1968).
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properly hold that there is a reasonable relationship between the integrity
and efficiency of public service and union membership .... . Indeed, the
merit, quality and efficiency of public service are likely to be enhanced by
the requirement of union membership where the majority of workers have
voted in favor of union representation. Management has learned that
individuals who persist in 'riding free" frequently cause dissension on
the job, impairing efficiency. As a result, union membership as a condi-
tion of employment is commonplace today in private labor agreements.
Ironically, public employees alone are subjected to truly unreasonable
conditions of employment that are totally unrelated to efficiency or quali-
fications. Membership in the political "flower fund" is one such harsh
example. Another is that public employees are often required to reside
in the community by which they are employed as a condition of continued
employment. Clearly, if the public employer may arbitrarily impose such
an employment condition upon his workers, then he must possess both
the legal and moral right to agree to a bilateral bargain that requires union
membership as a condition of continued employment. I would repeat,
however, that such condition should be imposed only as part of a con-
tract that also, during its life, bans strikes and lockouts, and submits all
unresolved grievances to binding arbitration.
Having hopefully overcome the union shop deterrent to National La-
bor Relations Board coverage for public employees, let us turn again to
that thorniest, the most controversial of questions that plague the public
service-the strike. If this "hang-up" could be resolved, the final ob-
stacle to National Labor Relations Board extension would be removed,
and rationality instead of sovereignty would reign at last.
It has been postulated that impasse during the life of a contract is to
be reconciled by arbitration. What of impasse during contract negotia-
tions? Because it is so broadly assumed that the strike must not be legal-
ized in public employment, and because the National Labor Law so care-
fully assures the right of covered workers to strike, the logical conclusion
has been exclusion of public employees from the National Labor Rela-
tions Law. This simple syllogism enjoys such wide acceptance within
the labor movement that to propose inclusion for public employees im-
plies to protected unionists the necessity of special modification of the
law and thus the probable weakening of the basic statute as it relates to
workers in private employment. Labor thus reacts negatively to such
proposals for change. Yet, the bargaining breakdown does take place in
private and public labor relations, and strikes of varying impact on the
public interest do occur in both sectors.
In the vast majority of private collective bargaining situations, inter-
nal restraints at work on both parties and the routine availability of medi-
9 M. Seasongood, supra note 6 at 346.
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ation result in peaceful settlement of the contract. Of the estimated four
percent that erupt into work stoppages, very few can be termed public in-
terest strikes that are calculated to bring into play the emergency proce-
dures of the National Labor Relations Act or the Railway Labor Act.
We assume in the ordinary strike situation that although tension is
heightened and unfriendly incidents may take place on the picket line,
the result is also to speed up the bargaining process and assure rapid de-
livery of the product-a contract. The temporary dislocation and incon-
venience to the public entailed in such stoppages, the frictions generated
between the principals, should be and are absorbable by the very strong
fabric which holds our democratic society together. Even the lengthy
strike by major airlines in the spring of 1967 was bearable, one might say
healthy, for the small minority of Americans who regularly use air traffic
to get from one place to another. High-flying, fast, non-stop jets were
grounded; but hedge-hopping, slow, puddle-jumper, prop-jobs were sched-
uled and available. The view from a few thousand feet is still, in this
age of supersonic flight, very beautiful. If it takes a strike to help us re-
trieve images that have been lost because modern speeds and distance ex-
ceed the shutter and lens capability of our natural eye equipment, then
someone may suggest that such a strike is indeed in the public interest. A
kind of Malthusian balance may be involved here, the outlines of which
are not fully discernible, and perhaps never should or will be.
But, certain strikes have been designated as sufficiently threatening
to the public interest to warrant government intrusion under the Railway
Labor Act or the National Labor Relations Act. The latter, as amended
in 1947, gave to the President of the United States the power to declare
a labor dispute an "emergency," to seek a Federal court injunction pro-
hibiting such strike or lock-out for a period of eighty days, and to em-
panel a fact-finding board to report directly to the President on the facts
of the dispute prior to the expiration of the eighty-day "cooling-off"
period. The airline strike alluded to above was subject to similar, but not
identical, procedures provided for in the Railway Labor Act of 1926.
The President chose not to invoke the emergency authority, preferring to
press informally on the conflicting parties the persuasive, although in
this case not conclusive, authority of his office. In the case of the New
York City transit tie-up a year earlier, neither the Railway Labor Act nor
the National Labor Relations Act was applicable since the dispute in-
volved municipal employment.
From 1950 through 1967, 'National Labor Relations Board eighty-day
injunctions were sought in twenty cases. In one instance, injunctive
relief was denied. Strikes were resumed or occurred following the "cool-
ing-off" period on five occasions. These, however, were confined to
the maritime industry. Even these, a recent report indicates, did not af-
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fect the public interest. According to the New York Times of January
11, 1970, "... . major strikes do far less ... harm than generally feared....
A Labor Department study of longshore strikes in 1963, 1965, and 1969
had concluded that the strikes had no visible impact on the U.S. economy
even though injunctions had been invoked on the grounds that the na-
tion's health or safety was jeopardized. The strikes resumed when the
eighty-day injunctions expired." Also significant is the fact that the
federal injunctions were honored by the unions in every case since 1950.
Although it has been urged that fact-finding panels appointed by the
president be vested with the authority to make recommendations in order
to hasten settlement, the record under the emergency powers section
has been surprisingly effective. This is certainly so if contrast is made
with dispute situations in which the federal labor law is not applicable.
The labor-management battle ground in the public service, for example,
is scarred where local court injunctions, promulgated in panic, actually
ignited rather than soothed explosive situations. State and local restraining
orders issued against public employee strikes are almost always eleventh-
hour actions, drawn hastily and totally, and designed to ban all picket-
ing and concerted activity. Because the injunction comes inevitably at
the climactic moment, and is thus construed as a test of union virility,
the order is often loudly and literally held in contempt. Instead of cool-
ing off, as has been the case with National Labor Relations Board tem-
porary orders, injunctions issued under repressive statutory and common
law tend to exacerbate already inflamed feelings. And, as we have seen,
disregard for the law, although contempt has carried penalties, has been
at times ignored by public officials, and has even been rewarded. While
federal court injunctions mandating an eighty-day cooling-off period
have been uniformly adhered to by the parties at conflict, restraining or-
ders in public employee disputes have been variously met with bitter
resistance, including contempt and jail terms; with bitter resistance, ex-
cluding contempt; with bitterness and a return to work; with bitterness
and no penalties against the strikers who have clearly violated the law;
with bitterness and pay for time lost; with bitterness alone.
It would seem that if peace and justice are truly the goals of labor-
management law, we would immediately recognize the efficacy of a
uniformly and universally applicable federal system available in all dis-
pute situations, private or public. We should want to extend a relatively
successful procedure embodied in the National Labor Relations Act to
the public area. State laws that ban strikes by public employees have
generally failed to achieve either peace or justice. Where repressive law
imposes peace, it usually disposes of justice.
Even though we know that policemen, firefighters, prison guards and
hospital workers have in fact gone out on strike, can we afford to legiti-
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mize such stoppages? It is true that we have survived these illegal
strikes. We've somehow muddled through. Certainly strikes by public
workers in less sensitive areas have not seriously impaired our ability to
function. But, what of the strikes where the public health and safety are
deeply affected? In such cases, what if an eighty-day cooling-off period
fails to produce agreement? Can we expect the public to coolly contem-
plate the next step, if that step is a strike? Companies, and their cus-
tomers, do "take a strike." The employer plans his strategy to include
the prospect of a work stoppage; his tactics may include an effort to
operate at least on a skeleton, emergency basis. Do we have the right
to expect that the public employer, and his "customers," may plan simi-
larly in the event a strike occurs in a vital service? The facts indicate
that some public service employers have undertaken precisely this kind of
planning, and have done it successfully.
New York City has had its public strikes. Injunctions, contempt cita-
tions, fines and jail sentences have all been part of the scene. Instead of
the usual panic, one could, if he stretched his mind, conceive of a news
report on the eve of a strike that calmly advises us: "CITY CONFI-
DENT OF MEETING NEEDS AS STRIKE NEARS; EXPECTS 4000
SUPERVISORS TO HANDLE THE CHORES OF 20,000 UNION
MEMBERS." The news story goes on: "As Local One of the Union gath-
ered its red, white and blue picket signs and public officials brought in
coffee pots to ease their extended hours, the big question remained-
can the agency meet the needs of the public without the help of 20,000
striking employees? Yes, was the employer's firm prediction. ... The
agency has asked the public to use only essential services during the
peak demand period between 4 P.M. and 9 P.M." Described here could
have been a stoppage, for example, by the city's water department em-
ployees. But, this is not likely, considering the employer's obvious will-
ingness to "take" the strike. We know how public employers normally re-
act and fantasy can only be carried so far. The story, however, with only
minor paraphrasing, is one that did appear on the front page of The
New York Times on December 1, 1968. The strike, which did take place,
was by the public service employees of the electric utility of New York
City. Certainly, the public health and safety were theoretically jeopar-
dized; yet, the workers, covered by National Labor Relations Board, were
protected in their right to strike, and indeed, did strike. The public
service employer, sensitive to the right of the employees to strike despite
the fact that they had never chosen to strike before, planned nevertheless
for that eventuality. When it came to pass, the agency "took" the strike,
bargaining continued at a faster pace than before, and an agreement
was reached. No firings, no fines, no jail terms, no injunctions, no last-
ing bitterness, and happily, no serious deprivation of a vital public service.
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Playing it "cool" may not be a panacea, but it certainly helps. We
panic at the thought of a strike by prison guards; yet, this represents
probably the simplest security situation to contain. Neither the army
nor the national guard may be capable of carrying on an inmate reha-
bilitation program, but both are of course capable of maintaining order
in a prison. At the very least the public will be protected from the
prisoners. At the very worst the inmates, during a strike, will be re-
lieved of participation in what are, generally, woefully inadequate reha-
bilitation programs.
If New York City was able to "take" a strike of its electric employees,
should we expect our cities to absorb a stoppage of water service? Ex-
tensive automation and skillful use of supervisory personnel enabled
the electric utility to ride out the strike. Water service lends itself
equally to automated devices; but what of the supervisory question? The
private utility, subject to National Labor Relations Board rules, not only
has had its foremen and supervisors excluded from the bargaining unit
for some years, but has undoubtedly worked hard to develop a disciplined
managerial cadre. The city's water department, although also a utility,
has never been under the National Labor Relations Board. Typically,
in such cases, supervision fails to thoroughly identify with either the
union or management, and some may indeed be union members at the
time a stoppage occurs. The ability of the water utility to "take" a strike
is clearly reduced.
Hospitals provide another area of vital service. Here, too, the cur-
rent situation suggests that new methods and the effective deployment of
professional supervisory personnel should permit at least essential func-
tions to continue. Automatic power systems are nearly universal today
in hospitals. Electronic surveillance techniques are available as replace-
ment for physical observation of patients. If hospitals in a given area
were to cooperatively use the devices and techniques accessible to them,
instead of indulging in unnecessary and wasteful competition, their ability
to withstand strike threats would be enhanced. Only the most inefficient
hospitals are entirely unable to cope with a stoppage, in part because in
such situations professional personnel are probably as disenchanted as
are rank and file workers.
The general public in other democratic nations appears to have ac-
commodated itself to the inconvenience of public employee strikes. To-
talitarian countries of course do not tolerate strikes at all. But, in Italy,
where there has been a recent rash of public worker stoppages, citizens
are now urged to pick up their telephones upon arising and "Dial-a-strike"
to learn whether the mail is being delivered, the garbage is being picked
up, the banks are taking deposits, or-if the phone company is operating.
Of course the "'dial-a-strike" message itself is recorded and automated!
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The discussion turns again to police and fire services. Should we per-
mit such workers National Labor Relations Board coverage and the right
to strike? We do not now provide for either. Yet, police and firefighters
do organize, they seek to bargain collectively almost always for both rank
and file and officers, and despite the no-strike laws, they do on rare occa-
sions get "sick" or find it necessary to go into extended "study" sessions.
They have even struck outright. No-strike laws do not appear to deter
strikes in any section of the public service.
On the contrary, I have suggested that workers, including public em-
ployees and particularly those employed in essential services, experience
internal restraints regarding strikes that are far more compelling than re-
pressive laws. It has been my contention that the unrestricted right to
strike, without exception, is a more reliable deterrent to irresponsible ac-
tion than is the restrictive statute. Emergency disputes have been han-
dled far more effectively under National Labor Relations Board proce-
dures than has been the case in similar crises outside the jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board. If our concern is for peace and
justice in labor relations, than we should not hesitate to extend the
coverage of the National Labor Relations Act to state and local govern-
ment employees. If, however, our expressed alarm over public strikes is
merely a mask to maintain fifteen percent of the American work force in
economic subjugation, then we will resist efforts to apply the National
Labor Relations Board to the public service.
It is a sad irony that observers of the public scene have attempted to
perpetuate separation on the premise that private strikes are "economic,"
and public strikes are "political." In a generally penetrating article, 10 Jack
Stieber insists that "The economic and market pressures which operate in
private industry do not exist in the public sector." I suspect that they
are largely the same for both employers and employees in the private
and public sectors. For public workers, particularly, "economic pres-
sures" are devastating. It is only when we contemplate the gap in wages
and benefits between those employed in public as opposed to private en-
terprise that we begin to appreciate the magnitude of our problem.
Closing the gap in the nation's labor law is an essential first step. But
procedures alone will not bridge the economic gap. That issue is yet to
be resolved. Our immediate task is to provide the rules best calculated
to assure that the path to economic justice for public employees will be
a reasonably peaceful one.
10 L. Ullman, Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, Challenge to Collective Bar-
gaining 65-88 (Prentice-Hall, 1967).
